

MANAS

VOLUME VIII, No. 38

Fifteen Cents

SEPTEMBER 21, 1955

THE NEW STUDY OF MOTIVES

TO speak of the study of motives as "new" may seem misleading, except in the perspective of centuries, yet there is a genuine "newness" about the modern interest in motives if only for the reason that the historical consequences of this interest can only be guessed at. Eventually, it may greatly reduce hostility; it might even stop war. The actual study of motives was hardly possible, historically speaking, until the emancipation from orthodox religious morals had taken place. Traditional Christianity presented a very simple polarity in respect to human motives—either you did the will of God or you did the will of the Devil, or oscillated between the two. There was a code which enabled you to identify the state of your moral health, and there were priests to interpret the code on all points of human behavior.

But with Darwin, Marx, and Freud—to name the three great iconoclastic figures of the nineteenth century—came the weakening and finally the destruction of the old system of explaining behavior. While Darwin said little about motives, this theory of evolution effectively removed from the cosmos the outside forces which had been held responsible for them. Marx, along with his economic theories, offered some acute psychological analysis of the effects of modern methods of production on the human psyche, and Freud began the cycle—far from complete—of study of the relations between the emotions and the mind.

One effect of the work of these three was the redefinition of the world in "natural" terms, making it a world in which words like "right" and "wrong" lost their traditional meaning. This, of course, was a radical departure from the old religious scheme. But the new world of nineteenth-century physics, biology, sociology, and psychology resembled the old world of Christian teaching in one respect—it was still a deterministic world in which man reflected the play of forces which originated outside himself and about which he could do very little. While Darwin did not deny the moral freedom of human beings, the implications of his theory, in the context of nineteenth-century biology, certainly did. Although Marx declared for the "liberation" of man from the shackles of Capitalist oppression, the processes of emancipation were held to result from impersonal economic laws—the dialectic of historical materialism—helped on by an élite of revolutionaries who are themselves pretty much without explanation except as some sort of minor deities who enter the historical process as self-conscious agents of natural law, in order to execute its requirements.

Nor does Freud leave much room for independent motive or decision. All the reasons men have for doing what they do seem, in his system, to be acquired from either outside or irrational sources of one sort or another.

So, the nineteenth-century greats (Freud, of course, reached well into the twentieth century), while they opened vast new fields for the study of the technology of human behavior, allowed us no real freedom of decision. All they did was to destroy the authority of the old sources of motive, substituting a multitude of lesser springs of action. From the dualist determinism of Christianity we passed to the pluralist determinism of science.

Perhaps we shouldn't say, "All they did . . .," since theirs were magnificent if limited accomplishments. They formed a "protestant revolution" with teeth in it, as compared to the Lutheran reformation, which before long fell back into a number of petty orthodoxies, some of them mourning somewhat the lost authority of a Rome which could demand a uniform faith. The determinism of the scientific theory of human behavior was perhaps a necessary weapon in the war with theology. If the revolutionary theorists had left *any* cause of human action or thought undetermined by an outside force, the champions of orthodoxy would probably have claimed it at once for God. They did anyway, since as soon as research scientists in physics and biology began to admit that they were puzzled by the failure of certain natural processes to conform to familiar laws, the polemicists of religion gained new courage, quickly turning out learned books to show that God, after all, *does* have a place in the cosmos. This was not very flattering to God, who, in practical fact, had been reduced to the leavings of science for His empire, but the writers of such books didn't look at it that way. Eventually they found considerable comfort in the works of men like Lecomte du Noüy and Arnold Toynbee.

The point of reviewing this phase of intellectual and cultural history is that, today, we are beginning to get non-deterministic and non-religious studies of motive. Various factors are contributing to this trend, but the most important one is the work of the post-Freudian psychoanalysts and the eclectic psychiatrists—men who are humanist rather than determinist in outlook. These thinkers do not feel that they must compete with Jehovah in claiming over-all authority. They do not *want* an over-all authority, whether a monotheistic deity or an impersonal scientific law. Instead, they show an inclination to leave an un-

defined area of decision for human beings, in which they may be free. There is no theory of freedom as yet, but only room for a theory, should one develop.

Here, at any rate, is full justification for speaking of the *new* study of motives, by writers who are amplifying the analysis begun by psychologists without determinist overtones.

The fruits of this kind of writing have great value. In the *American Scholar* for last winter, Richard Hofstadter, professor of history at Columbia University, sought to determine some of the roots of the hysteria in present-day political life in America, naming his inquiry "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt." To understand what Mr. Hofstadter is getting at, a rather full quotation characterizing the pseudo-conservative will be helpful:

The restlessness, suspicion and fear manifested in various phases of the pseudo-conservative revolt give evidence of the real suffering which the pseudo-conservative experiences in his capacity as a citizen. He believes himself to be living in a world in which he is spied upon, plotted against, betrayed, and very likely destined for total ruin. He feels that his liberties have been arbitrarily and outrageously invaded. He is opposed to almost everything that has happened in American politics for the past twenty years. He hates the very thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt. He is disturbed deeply by American participation in the United Nations, which he can see only as a sinister organization. He sees his own country as being so weak that it is constantly about to fall victim to subversion; and yet he feels that it is so all-powerful that any failure it may experience in getting its way in the world—for instance, in the Orient—cannot possibly be due to its limitations but must be attributed to its having been betrayed. He is the most bitter of our citizens about our involvement in the wars of the past, but seems the least concerned about avoiding the next one. While he naturally does not like Soviet communism, what distinguishes him from the rest of us who dislike it is that he shows little interest in, is often indeed bitterly hostile to, such realistic measures as might actually strengthen the United States vis-à-vis Russia. He would much rather concern himself with the domestic scene, where communism is weak, than with those areas of the world where it is really strong and threatening. He wants to have nothing to do with the democratic nations of Western Europe, which seem to draw more of his ire than the Soviet Communists, and he is opposed to all "give-away programs" designed to aid and strengthen these nations. Indeed, he is likely to be antagonistic to most of the operations of our federal government except Congressional investigations, and to almost all of its expenditures. Not always, however, does he go so far as the speaker at the Freedom Congress who attributed the greater part of our national difficulties to "this nasty, stinking 16th [income tax] Amendment."

The type is so clearly drawn that anyone can recognize Mr. Hofstadter's portrait of the pseudo-conservative—"pseudo," since he has not the virtues of the true conservative. As Adorno remarks in *The Authoritarian Personality*, the pseudo-conservative combines "conventionality and authoritarian submissiveness" in his conscious thinking with "violence, anarchic impulses, and chaotic destructiveness in the unconscious sphere. . . ." Some of the people in this group turn their fanaticism into a way of making a living, as organizers of patriotic groups, defenders of "Americanism," or as champions of "fundamental" education. They thus, as Hofstadter wryly remarks, turn "a tendency toward paranoia into a vocational asset, probably one of the most perverse forms of occupational therapy known to man."

But *why*? Why are these people so troubled? Hofstadter's theory is that they are driven by the heterogeneity and rootlessness of American life to a scramble for status and a "search for secure identity." He writes:

Because, as a people extremely democratic in our social institutions, we have had no clear, consistent and recognizable system of status, our personal status problems have an unusual intensity. Because we no longer have the relative ethnic homogeneity we had up to about eighty years ago, our sense of belonging has long had about it a high degree of uncertainty. We boast of "the melting pot," but we are not quite sure what it is that will remain when we have been melted down.


Hofstadter distinguishes between *interest politics*—involving the obvious partisanship of conflicting material aims—and *status politics*, which reflects inner, psychological problems. Interest politics is likely to prevail in hard times, but in an era of prosperity, status politics may claim greater attention. "It is the tendency of status politics to be expressed more in vindictiveness, in sour memories, in the search for scapegoats, than in realistic proposals for positive action." The status politician moves in the sphere of frustration, dealing only superficially with political realities. His real currency is the human longing for emotional satisfaction. Mr. Hofstadter quotes from Samuel Lubell the conjecture that the right-wing agitator's followers "find the agitator's statements attractive not because he occasionally promises to 'maintain the American standards of living' or to provide a job for everyone, but because he intimates that he will give them the emotional satisfactions that are denied them in the contemporary social and economic set-up."

The haunting fear that one will dissolve into a nobody—be lost in the impersonal stream—leads some people to make a special career of proclaiming their own "loyalty" and heaping scorn on those who seem less eager to demonstrate their political purity. Hofstadter writes:

One notable quality in this new wave of conformism is that its advocates are much happier to have as their objects of hatred the Anglo-Saxon, Eastern, Ivy League intellectual gentlemen than they are with such bedraggled souls as, say, the Rosenbergs. The reason, I believe, is that in the minds of the status-driven it is no special virtue to be more American than the Rosenbergs, but it is really something to be more American than Dean Acheson or John Foster Dulles—or Franklin Delano Roosevelt. The status aspirations of some of the ethnic groups are actually higher than they were twenty years ago—which suggests one reason (there are others) why, in the ideology of the authoritarian right-wing, anti-Semitism and such blatant forms of prejudice have recently been soft-pedaled. We Americans are always trying to raise the standard of living, and the same principle now seems to apply to standards of hating. So during the past fifteen years or so, the authoritarians have moved on from anti-Negroism and anti-Semitism to anti-Achesonism, anti-intellectualism, anti-nonconformism, and other variants of the same idea, much in the same way as the average American, if he can manage it, will move on from a Ford to a Buick.

The special circumstances of the present—a disordered world, with enormous potential violence, the break-down of old patterns of social distinction, plus the general homogenization of culture in a mass industrial society—all these things, Hofstadter thinks, have made the problem of concrete identity and status a pressing one for many Americans. Hence the high tide of pseudo-conservative dissent.

(Turn to page 8)



REVIEW

NOTES ON RELIGION

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY for May 1955 devotes the entire second half of its bulky issue—a separate 90-page magazine—to “The Early and the Contemporary Study of Religion” as attempted by sociologists. The present editor, Everett Hughes, of the University of Chicago, precedes the reprinting of six outstanding papers—papers which appeared in the *Journal* during the past fifty years—with some remarks upon why religion will be, even for the sociologists, “a subject of eternal interest.” It is apparent that, since what Dr. Hughes terms the “cynical and dismal form of emancipation from religion,” marking the writings of more than a few early sociologists, has died away, a broader viewpoint is in the making.

The tone of Dr. Hughes’ observations is suggestive of the spirit responsible for this transition, especially in his remark that “when we sociologists are mature enough to study ourselves and our works with that combination of objectivity with curiosity which we achieve so easily in studying other lines of work, the chief theme of our study will be the relation of emancipation to knowledge and inquiry.”

“Some,” Hughes continues, “grow emancipated from the faith of their fathers just enough to want to run from it and to tear from their clothing all the name-tags of the past; others, just enough to turn in bitter attack upon the very faith that gave them the energy to make their mark in the world, and sometimes, in not accidental error, to turn poisoned weapons upon themselves. Still others, having somehow conserved the energy and the spirit of the movements in which they were bred, have combined the sensitive knowledge of participation with a detachment which lets them see even dear things in their universal aspect. Many of the sociologists of the 1950’s are emancipated from other faiths and cultures than those of Sumner, Small, Faris, and the present-day middle generations of American sociologists. At least one history of American sociology could be written on the basis of the various things succeeding generations have been partly emancipated from. When they are fully emancipated, it probably makes no difference.”

As if proving the verity of the last quoted sentence, we find in a paper produced by Georg Simmel, in 1905, the following declaration: “I do not believe,” writes Simmel, “that the religious feelings and impulses manifest themselves in religion only; rather, that they are to be found in many connections, a co-operating element in various situations, whose extreme development and differentiation is religion as an independent content of life. In order, now, to find the points at which, in the shifting conditions of human life, the momenta of religion originated, it will be necessary to digress to what may seem to be entirely foreign phenomena.”

Is this not an admission that the truly “objective” sociologist must admit an *objective* awareness of mysticism, and the necessity for each man to establish symbolic means of focussing high faith? Also, is not the fact that Dr. Simmel in 1905, and Dr. Hughes in 1955, say very much the same thing, indicative again of eternal psychological verities?

Simmel is a provocative enough writer for any decade:

It must be emphatically insisted upon that, no matter how mundanely and empirically the origin of ideas about the super-mundane and transcendental is explained, neither the subjective emotional value of these ideas, nor their objective value as matters of fact, is at all in question. Both of these values lie beyond the limits which our merely genetic, psychological inquiry aims to reach.

In attempting to find the beginnings of religion in human relations which are in themselves non-religious, we merely follow a well-known method. It has long been admitted that science is merely a heightening, a refinement, a completion, of those means of knowledge which, in lower and dimmer degree, assist us in forming our judgments and experiences in daily, practical life. We only then arrive at a genetic explanation of art when we have analyzed those aesthetic experiences of life, in speech, in the emotions, in business, in social affairs, which are not in themselves artistic. All high and pure forms existed at first experimentally, as it were, in the germ, in connection with other forms; but in order to comprehend them in their highest and independent forms we must look for them in their undeveloped states. Their significance, psychologically, will depend upon the determination of their proper places in a series which develops, as if by an organic growth, through a variety of stages, so that the new and differentiated in each appears as the unfolding of a germ contained in that which had preceded it. Thus it may help us to an insight into the origin and nature of religion, if we can discover in all kinds of non-religious conditions and interests certain religious momenta, the beginnings of what came to be religion, definitely and independently. . . .

In conclusion, Simmel adds that “more important even than to deny that we offer there a theory of the historical origin of religion, is it to insist that the objective truth of religion has nothing whatever to do with this investigation. Even if we have succeeded in the attempt to understand religion as a product of the subjective conditions of human life, we have not at all impinged upon the problem whether the objective reality which lies outside of human thought contains the counterpart and confirmation of the psychical reality which we have here discussed. Thus the psychology of cognition seeks to explain how the mind conceives the world to be spatial, and of three dimensions, but is content to have other disciplines undertake to prove whether beyond our mental world there is a world of things in themselves of like forms.”

In the *Autonomous Groups Bulletin* for Autumn, 1954, we come across a most interesting piece, abridged by permission of Dr. Philip Wiener from his *Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism*, wherein the role of metaphysical speculation in the development of *pragmatism* is discussed in historical setting. It appears that William James was one

(Turn to page 4)



Issued weekly by the
MANAS PUBLISHING COMPANY
 P.O. Box 32112, El Sereno Station
 LOS ANGELES 32, CALIFORNIA

\$5 a Year

15 cents a Copy

MORE OF THE SAME

WE have come across two articles which add considerably to subjects explored recently in MANAS. One, "The Confidence Man," by Donald Meyer, concerns Norman Vincent Peale's techniques of "reassurance," and appears in the *New Republic* for July 11. (See "Is it 'Religion'?" MANAS, July 20.) Meyer locates Mr. Peale's devoted audience among the fearful of status. Peale promises no "better world"—the one we have is just dandy. We have only to "change ourselves." Peale's "typical patients," Meyer thinks, dwell in "the world of business, specifically, of small business, of sales and advertising, and of the lower executive bureaucracy." They include "the would-be independent enterpriser, trying to live on his own guts and inspiration, but caught and exposed in the controlled markets of the modern economic system; the sales manager, endlessly responsible for new and newer gimmicks, drained endlessly by the demand put upon him that he not *be* himself but *sell* himself." Further:

Some of these people—and their wives—suffer from status panic. But still more seem to suffer, more seriously, from status apathy. It is not so much that they have failed the trials, as that they do not seem to enjoy the fruits they have earned. Since they accept the managed world of business implicitly, however, as a realm of salvation, their apathy does not mean liberation to a possible new self and salvation independent of the system, but instead guilt and those feelings of inferiority to which Peale addresses himself. . . .

The other article is a case study of recent "public relations" operations—"The Engineering of Consent," by Robert Bendiner, appearing in the *Reporter* for Aug. 11. (See "American Self-Criticism," MANAS, Aug. 3.) This article deals with the efforts of one "team" of public relations experts (retained by the railroads) to defeat Pennsylvania legislation which would permit trucks to haul heavier loads within the state, of its success, and what happened after, when another enterprising PR agency entered the lists in the truckers' behalf. "Engineering of Consent" is a grandiose phrase used by the PR experts themselves to describe their art, and, as Mr. Bendiner remarks, "when it comes to 'engineering' people's minds, the question naturally arises as to the moral mileage we have covered from The Public Be Damned to The Public Be Maneuvered."

We Americans are not supposed to like managed thinking—"Thought Control" is the epithet applied to totalitarian techniques. But what if "capitalists" do it? Is thought control a fine thing when done for a private profit,

REVIEW—(continued)

of a select group of young men who, about 1870, formed a "Metaphysical Club" in the environs of Harvard—a title inspired by a desire to fly in the face of the even then popular distaste for metaphysical discussion. As one of the club members put it:

It was in the earliest seventies that a knot of us young men in Old Cambridge, calling ourselves, half-ironically, half defiantly, "The Metaphysical Club,"—for agnosticism was then riding its high horse, and was frowning superbly upon all metaphysics—used to meet, sometimes in my study, sometimes in that of William James. . . . Mr. Justice Holmes . . . will not, I believe, take it ill that we are proud to remember his membership; nor will Joseph Warner, Esq. Nicholas St. John Green was one of the most interested fellows, a skillful lawyer and a learned one, a disciple of Jeremy Bentham. . . . Chauncey Wright, something of a philosophical celebrity in those days, was never absent from our meetings. I was about to call him our coryphaeus; but he will better be described as our boxing-master whom we—I particularly—used to face to be severely pummeled. . . . John Fiske and, more rarely, Francis Ellingwood Abbot, were sometimes present.

For nearly half a century academic men and researchers spoke a language so specialized that few outside each respective field could even understand—let alone be interested in—what was being talked about. The foregoing quotations are submitted as but a small part of a chain of evidence that a new "science of man" is getting ready to be born, encouraged by the wider perspectives of present day scholars who realize that synthesis, not specialization, leads towards adequate understanding. Orthodox psychiatric publications now include frequent articles on parapsychological phenomena, psychoanalysts discuss religion, medical men devote attention to "psychosomatics": the walls dividing fields of investigation crumble on every hand.

As broader perspectives emerge, it is to be expected that new insights into the history of each school of thought will be in evidence; this recalling of "The Metaphysical Club" and the connection with it of William James seem part of an increasing recognition that *some* sort of interest in metaphysics is apt to play a potent role in every variety of affirmation.

but dastardly in behalf of an ideological public good? Mr. Bendiner's sprightly analysis—ten pages, and worth it—makes you wonder.

MANAS is a journal of independent inquiry, concerned with study of the principles which move world society on its present course, and with search for contrasting principles—that may be capable of supporting intelligent idealism under the conditions of life in the twentieth century. **MANAS** is concerned, therefore, with philosophy and with practical psychology, in as direct and simple a manner as its editors and contributors can write. The word "manas" comes from a common root suggesting "man" or "the thinker." Editorial articles are unsigned, since **MANAS** wishes to present ideas and viewpoints, not personalities.

The Publishers

CHILDREN ... and Ourselves

As we had suspected, attempts to clarify the current debates about teaching methods in our schools may leave a writer with the feeling that he is sprinkling water on the ocean. The two major emphases represented by those parents and teachers presently engaged in controversy—one, of the "socially-oriented" or the "community-oriented" school, and the other calling for return to more stringent basic disciplines—always bring into focus a collection of sociological factors which stretch out into infinite distance. Take for instance a passage in a recent UNESCO publication, *The Teaching of the Social Sciences in the United States*. In the preface to this study, Prof. Henry Ehrmann notes:

In America, as elsewhere, the educational system both reflects and reproduces social conditions. A system of higher education which in a single year serves close to one-third of the adolescent population and which shows an increase in student enrolment of 1,000 per cent in half a century, is undoubtedly product and generator of a mass civilization. The foreign observer, if he has been steeped in more individualistic traditions, should never forget the implications of such learning and the universities of other lands. "Mass education, like mass suffrage and mass production," remarks the American anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn, "is a leading trait of our code."

There is little wonder that our public schools gravitate towards complicated "mass" programs of instruction, reflecting the particular interests or biases of the most influential professionals of the day. Perhaps it is for this reason that, after inspecting some teachers' manuals and readers designed for various grades, we find ourselves somewhat appalled by the intricacy of the system and the uniformity of the material encountered by children of all ages. This may be inevitable, and it may not, in any real sense, be a "bad" thing, but the impression persists that, because of intensive systematizing, the education of the young in our time has been separated from the comprehension of parents. The schools are "institutions," very much and very definitely so, no matter how teachers and principals may wish to represent an "organic community," and the parents live outside this institution. Professional educators employ a specialized language, not a particularly inviting one because of its many compound terms. Now, the failure of parents probably had a lot to do—in fact most to do—with this growth of our institutions of learning into such formidable affairs, but the trouble now is that when parents wish to understand the teachers, and have the teachers understand them, this is not as easy as it might be. At least, we have talked with some parents who try, apparently sincerely, and to a teacher or two whose sincerity also need not be questioned.

Since we are now working our way around to a few tentative criticisms of the modern school, and since we do not wish to follow in the footsteps of either of those over-enthusiastic polemicists, Albert Lynd and Rudolf Flesch, this is an appropriate time to present a few paragraphs from Arthur Morgan's *Community Service News* (Jan.-Mar., 1955). Arthur Morgan can hardly be called a foe of "community-centered" education, having devoted a considerable portion of his life to development of the well-known pro-

gram of study and work at Antioch College. The "community" approach is explained by this passage from V.T. Thayer's *The Attack on the American Secular School*:

The obvious fact that modern conditions of living tend to deprive young people of firsthand and responsible occasions that once promoted social maturity . . . points the need for the creation within the school of opportunities for service. Within the school, did I say? I should have said, it means a breaking down of water-tight compartments between the school and the community so that in ways appropriate to different age levels and abilities children are privileged to experience early and continuously the satisfaction that comes from playing a responsible role in family, school and community.

This is the simple yet compelling logic which stands behind the modern educator's enthusiasm for the "social-centered" or "community-centered" school. But, at this point, Dr. Morgan recognizes how easily enthusiastic educators can over-emphasize a certain truth in order to meet a need—and neglect other considerations meantime:

It is characteristic of professional educators, as of professionals in many other fields, that they incline to single-track thinking. First it was subject matter and personal discipline for maintaining order, and little else. Then came the progressive educator, bent on "self-expression" for the child, with inadequate regard either for subject matter or for social responsibility. Now comes the socially-oriented, or the community-oriented school, with too little interest in subject matter or in development of individuality, but with much interest in social relations.

Life is not like that. If one is to handle the everyday problems of life in an orderly and economical manner he must master appropriate subject matter. To give it but minor attention will greatly handicap boys and girls. Social attitudes and community participation are important, and should have attention which they have lacked. Yet to give a monopoly of attention to socialization and to social adaptation is to destroy or to mutilate individuality and personality.

Dr. Morgan's article, "Propaganda, Community and the Public School," should be read in its entirety by anyone interested in current discussions of school controversy, for while he takes no "side," his analysis is positive and assured. Just at the point where one feels Dr. Morgan may be ready to agree with some of the unqualified criticisms of Mortimer Smith's *The Diminished Mind*, he shifts to point out some other consideration entirely neglected by Smith. Particularly impressive is Morgan's unique summary of the need for integration of childhood education with community life—not because he wishes to see children "well adjusted," but precisely in order that they may have experience in standing out *against* community or institutional pressures:

To be able to act independently of the social drift is highly important. Seldom does a man achieve greatness who does not determinedly keep to his own course against the steady pressure of current custom. A part of every child's education should be to practice going his own way in important matters, independent of the crowd. Such independence must be learned by practice in the community, not just by reading about it. Good education does not lie in surrender to any one of these patterns, but in holding to all of them, and in keeping them in good relation to each other. Also it calls for acting in good faith, in the spirit of education, and not in the spirit of the propagandist. Any form of education can be violated and distorted by using it as an instrument of power.

"Propaganda, Community, and the Public School" should serve as evidence of the general usefulness of *Community Service News*, available at Box 243, Yellow Springs, (Turn to page 8)



FRONTIERS

RELIGION

SCIENCE

EDUCATION

Democracy at Work

THE critics of the United States, both at home and abroad, are many and various. What they say, furthermore, may often be both useful and correct. A country is weak indeed which cannot tolerate criticism, even a certain amount of unjust criticism, for almost any kind of criticism can be instructive—in regard to the critic, if not directly from what he says. Some criticisms of the United States, however, have reached the slogan or cliché stage, and have hardened into mere epithets. These are merely silly or stupid charges, not because they are altogether false, but because they are repeated without either reflection or understanding.

America, for example, is condemned as a country of "dollar-chasers." Its people are said to be "materialistic," uninterested in the "higher values," and wholly immune to the appeals of philosophy. They are called a nation of "pragmatists" who worship utility and demand that they become involved in nothing but "practical" matters.

Well, Americans do pursue dollars, and, for what it is worth, catch up with them with surprising success, and distribute them with an equity that has few parallels among comparable industrialized nations. Their "materialism" is perhaps the exuberance of the *nouveau riche*, as much as anything else, and is offensive to others for a variety of reasons. Then the almost proud ignorance of the average American concerning abstract matters, philosophical or otherwise, will doubtless justify any number of utterances concerning the brash ignorance of the American tourist and his neglect of the values preserved by older societies.

Let us admit these things, and deplore them. There is a sense, however, in which the claim that Americans are "un-philosophical" is simply not true—not true, at least, we think, in the broadly contemptuous way in which the claim is made.

The foundations of American society are actually more philosophical than any previous dispensation for a social order, if by "philosophical" we mean devotion to the quest for truth, and not simply a receptive attitude to views that are already known and acknowledged to be true. So far as the higher freedoms are concerned, the Constitution of the United States implies a profound faith in the capacity of the individual to seek and to find his own philosophical salvation, and it declares his right to do so without interference from either other individuals or public institutions such as the State.

Americans formulated this Constitution and have managed to live under the order of social relationships it created for something short of two hundred years. There have been failures, some of them disgraceful, but Americans have not yet failed. The American tradition, misrepresented and misconceived as it may be, is a tradition of im-

personal principles in government. This, we submit, is a *philosophical* tradition, and its application in practical affairs has produced a quality of freedom which has been the envy of the civilized world. The new countries of the East have all embodied at least some of the principles and ideas of the United States in their own charters of independence and self-government.

In addition to these primary philosophical documents, the United States has developed a number of private organizations devoted to preserving America's tradition of government by impersonal principles. The American Civil Liberties Union, if the best known, is but one of a number of such organizations. These organizations, let us note, studiously avoid any concern with what people think. Their interest is in maintaining the right of people to think what they please. This theory of rights, pursued to its origin, is found to be rooted in respect for man, and in man as a philosopher, both capable of and entitled to the forming of his own opinions.

Why is this "philosophical"? It is philosophical by derivation from the meaning of the word *philosophy*. Philosophy means love of truth. A man who loves the truth can suffer no restrictions as to where he will seek, and perhaps find, the truth. In a place or country where there is some "official" version of The Truth, a man who conforms to that version may be possessed of wisdom, he may be good, but he cannot be a philosopher. A philosopher cannot recognize any "official" doctrines. Any doctrine may be true, but never because it is official.

America, then, for all its excesses and follies, may be legitimately regarded as hospitable to philosophy, and to the extent that these principles are honored and observed, as the actual home of philosophers. Even if they have not found very much truth, they have at least preserved the *means* of finding it, and this may be far more important than the cherishing of any particular truth.

Two weeks ago, we reviewed here a collection of reports showing the rising concern in the United States for the principles of American government. This tide of interest in principles gives every indication of gaining further strength. Especially important is the fact that the vigilance of American citizens in respect to the preservation of their liberties is found in no particular class or political group, but manifests as a national characteristic. The most recent instance of this concern, and a most impressive one, is in publication of the first report of the Fund for the Republic, a non-profit corporation set up by the Ford Foundation to pursue an entirely independent course of watchful defense and support of the principles of constitutional government.

The tracing of this use of great wealth accumulated by a famous American industrialist may be of considerable interest. Henry Ford, as is well known, was a remarkable

man—remarkable as an inventor and industrial genius, and remarkable as a human being with strong humanitarian interests and opinions. Like many of his countrymen, Henry Ford combined some paternalistic tendencies which excite no admiration. He certainly did some foolish things, as he was heard to admit. But his quixotic mission of a "Peace Ship" sent to Europe to hasten the end of the first World War, even if "unrealistic" in regard to the way wars are started and concluded, was, as we see it, not among them. This was the action of a man with power who thought his power had made him free to do good. It hadn't, of course, but if other men with power tried to do similar things more often, *they might work*.

The good will of Henry Ford and the Ford family was eventually embodied in the charter of the Ford Foundation. We are not here going to attempt to assess the purposes and accomplishments of the Ford Foundation, except to say that this institution has seemed freer than most to do whatever in the opinion of its trustees needs to be done for peace, education, and human welfare. At any rate, not the least of its achievements was to create the Fund for the Republic and to place Mr. Hutchins, formerly president, then chancellor, of the University of Chicago, at its head.

What more could a man of great wealth do for his country, than to place a large portion of that wealth in the hands of individuals who can be trusted to devote themselves to support of the philosophic principles of the American Republic? America has no deep roots in ancestral tradition. America's culture lies in a method of doing things, not in a body of history or revered beliefs. In terms of Old-World culture, America is a noisy carousel of wild guesses and unhallowed enthusiasms. Its "ways" are not settled. Its civilization is not confirmed. How do you combine a puritan's prayer with a rebel yell? Henry J. Kaiser and Billy Graham? Frankie Sinatra and Katherine Cornell? If you are wise, you don't try to integrate all these things "Under the Constitution," "Under God," or under anything at all, but you leave to the future the evolution of authentic cultural unity for American civilization. All you can do is provide what assurances you can that Americans will remain free to work it out for themselves.

There is a happy historical fitness in the fact that Henry Ford left this legacy to the American people.

From Mr. Hutchins' first report, as President of the Fund for the Republic, we quote the following:

The fund for the Republic was established to deal with problems that exist today. It expects to spend its principal as fast as this can be judiciously done. It is not engaged in the support of long-term research. It is not interested in scholarship as such. Nor is it concerned with general education. Its efforts are focussed on the immediate issues of civil liberties. When it engages in research, or sponsors it, the Fund is seeking to obtain answers to questions that are pressing now.

What sort of questions are these? While we should like to see as many people as possible write to the Fund for the Republic for a copy of this Report (60 East 42nd Street, New York 17, N.Y., and 1444 Wentworth Avenue, Pasadena 5, Calif.), in order to consider all the projects which the Fund has found worth sponsoring, a few illustrations should be helpful, here.

There is for example the Loyalty-Security Program, designed to evaluate the methods chosen by the government

to clear Federal employees of suspicion of disloyalty. The recently published *Case Studies in Personnel Security*, a review of fifty loyalty cases, prepared by Adam Yarmolinsky, a Washington, D.C. attorney, is a part of this program. Mr. Yarmolinsky compiled a report which shows what sort of accusations were made against these civil employees, what sort of opportunity for defense was afforded them, the questions asked in hearings, and the effects such investigations have produced. While this study is simply a factual report, without comment or recommendations, its implications are so far-reaching that the *New York Times* devoted several columns to analysis and review of Mr. Yarmolinsky's work, giving instance after instance of hardship and injustice cited from the pages of the report.

Another project involves a report—scheduled for 1956 publication—of the practice of blacklisting in the entertainment industry—"the industry in which the practice has had the longest vogue." Since fear of Communist influence is back of most of the instances of violation of civil liberties, a thorough-going program of research is directed toward determining what has been the actual influence of Communists and the Communist Party on American life. Materials on this subject are being supplied to research libraries, and already one book, Samuel Stauffer's *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*, has resulted from the program. Further investigations, seeking to measure Communist propaganda and "infiltration" efforts and their results, will proceed for the next two or three years.

A very practical part of the Fund's program is the preparation of reference material which will be available to attorneys concerned in civil liberties issues. In Washington, for example, lawyers have lacked up-to-date references on the laws and regulations governing loyalty proceedings. The Fund has retained the help of specialists who will prepare a reference service to note changes in these laws and regulations and to keep track of the decisions of the courts and administrative tribunals. Similar problems occur in connection with the defense of conscientious objectors in the courts, and the American Friends Service Committee has received a grant to be devoted to legal representation of conscientious objectors to military service.

After these illustrations of the activities of the Fund, we return to Mr. Hutchins' explanation of its purposes:

The object of the Fund is to advance understanding of civil liberties. The Board of Directors believes that the rights of Americans should not be compromised or lost through neglect or confusion. It believes that the citizen should know what his rights are and what is happening to them. This is the reason why the Fund has used all the media of communication—radio, television, newspapers, magazines, records, and books—to arouse an interest in civil liberties and to encourage debate about them.

The Fund for the Republic is a kind of fund for the American Dream. This dream undoubtedly has economic aspects; many people came to this country in the hope of getting rich. But the essence of the dream is and always has been freedom, the escape from tyranny—political, religious, economic, social—into a country where a man could work out his own destiny in his own way. The Fund for the Republic is dedicated to reminding Americans of this essential quality of the American Dream and to reporting on the state of freedom today.

Since the remaining analysis by Mr. Hutchins of the contemporary scene in America in regard to civil liberties

seems at once clear, brief, and accurate, we print it as a useful memorandum:

There has seldom been a time at which these matters have not deserved attention. But it must be admitted that the Cold War has thrown the whole subject into unusual disorder. A political party in this country has been identified with the "enemy." Those associated with this party have therefore come under suspicion as an imminent danger to the state. In view of the weapons now available and of the examples of subversion that other countries have offered, the danger has seemed great, though often mysterious and intangible. It has appeared that the peril to the country could be dealt with only by methods that drastically departed from those which have characterized Anglo-American jurisprudence.

The range of suspected persons has been enormously extended by resort to guilt by association. The evidence offered to show that a man is a danger to American institutions has often been farcically remote. The treatment accorded suspected persons in Congressional investigations and administrative hearings has not always been that contemplated by the Sixth Amendment. A kind of continuous propaganda has accrued from claiming that others were indifferent to the threat of communism. The result has been that governmental officers, university presidents, and ordinary citizens have felt it necessary to exhibit inordinate anxiety on this score.

The Fund for the Republic takes no position on these matters, beyond affirming its faith in the principles upon which our government is founded, as set forth in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. The Fund does believe, however, that the American people, who must take a position on these matters, should pay attention to them and be adequately informed about them. The object of the Fund is to help supply the requisite information.

Thus, in the terms in which we opened this discussion, the Fund for the Republic reflects a philosophic interest of the American people, in that it seeks the welfare of impartial inquiry—the search for truth—but does not attempt to prejudice the inquiry in any particular direction. The moral power of this effort is obvious; its economic power, the result of the foresight and patriotism of a great American, is evidence of the non-materialistic side of American life. It is not too much to say that one who was probably the richest man in the United States made sure that his "material" resources would be devoted to the support of America's highest ideal—the freedom to think for yourself, and then to work peaceably for what you believe in.

THE NEW STUDY OF MOTIVES (continued)

Here, then, is an analysis of the political behavior of a considerable segment of American society, in terms of motive. Hofstadter, however, is not a doctor. He has no prescription; indeed, it is difficult to imagine any prescription for people who suffer from a sense of devaluation, and who are so unable to face the sort of world they live in that there seems very little likelihood that they can be persuaded even to *try* to understand it.

But what this article does is confront us with a problem in realistic terms. Ultimately, it is a problem in self-respect. Because the pseudo-conservative lacks conviction of his own importance as an individual, he "always imagines himself to be dominated and imposed upon because he feels that he is not dominant, and knows of no other way of interpreting his own position." The situation is tragic, for

the reason that, for these people, it is not enough to be human beings. They want to be a special kind of human beings. Simply being human does not supply them with dignity. They are the natural children of our unnatural culture—they have believed the advertisements in the magazines, they have listened to the promoters who feed on anxiety, and they are beset by the Furies as a result.

Well, we don't see how very much can be done for these people, except to show them patience. When there is understanding, patience is always possible. But we might be able to do something for their children, and their children's children. We might, that is, if we are willing to stop worshipping at the same shrines as they—for we do, even if with less credulity and more restraint. The central problem in a mass culture is to learn and maintain simple respect for human individuality—to accept no value which ignores this supreme value. If it means going against the grain of the mass culture, then we shall have to do that.

If we are going to profit by the new study of motives, we are going to have to deal with ourselves and others as educators, for from this study we learn that we can reach the objectives we long for in no other way.

CHILDREN—(continued)

Ohio. The article is full of excellent and characteristic quotations, including the statements of the basic themes of Pestalozzi and Froebel. Some of our inveterate traditionalists, by the way, may be surprised by the following from the writings of William Penn—who sounds as if he graduated from Columbia during the 1930's. More than two centuries ago he wrote:

We are in Pain to make them Scholars, but not Men! To talk, rather than to know, which is Canting.

The first Thing obvious to Children is what is sensible; and that we make no Part of their rudiments.

We press their Memory too soon, and puzzle, strain, and load them with Words and Rules; to know Grammar and Rhetorick, and a strange Tongue or two, that it is ten to one may never be useful to them; Leaving their natural Genius to Mechanical and Physical, or natural Knowledge uncultivated and neglected; which would be of exceeding Use and Pleasure to them through the whole Course of their Life.

To be sure, Languages are not to be despised or neglected. But Things are still to be preferred.

Children had rather be making Tools and Instruments of Play; Shaping, Drawing, Framing, and Building, etc., than getting some Rules of Propriety of Speech by Heart: And those also would follow with more Judgment, and less Trouble and Time.

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